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Policing the Past:  
 
Official History, Secrecy and British Intelligence since 19451
 
Richard J. Aldrich 
 
 
The British government has fought a long campaign to ensure that much of the history of its 
intelligence services remains secret.2 Since 1945, its most concerted opponents have been a motley 
band of memoir writers, journalists and intelligence historians. Britain’s gradual retreat from 
absolute secrecy in the area of intelligence history enjoys some parallels with Britain’s retreat from 
Empire. Arguably, the guardians of secrecy in the Cabinet Office have played the part of colonial 
governors, while the band of 'would-be writers' have taken the role of the native agitators. Like the 
retreat from Empire, government has been keen to characterise periodic concessions as part of a 
benign policy of deliberate liberalisation, proceeding by measured stages. But behind the scenes, the 
process has been troublesome, combative and, at times, accompanied by something bordering on 
panic.  After the Second World War, Britain's 'empire of secrecy' had begun to show signs of over-
stretch, and officials puzzled over how to deal with pressure for the release of secrets.  
Official history has played an intriguing role in the policing of Britain's secret past. For the 
policy-makers, the official history has offered multiple advantages. Carrying the stamp of authority, 
official history permitted a sober account of events to be advanced that contrasted with the 
increasingly sensationalist nature of 'outsider' publications. Moreover, it provided some positive 
influence over that difficult terrain - the public understanding of the past - while at the same time 
appearing more reasonable than simply 'stonewalling' on the subject of intelligence. To extend the 
colonial analogy, official history might be seen as a form of 'indirect rule', with official historians 
playing the part of indigenous notables, enjoying the privileges of access, official status and 
authority, but at the risk of being regarded by some as 'colonial collaborators'.3
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Britain’s ‘long retreat’ from Empire has been well catalogued. By contrast, the policies, 
which underpinned the long retreat from absolute secrecy, have themselves been secret. In 
particular, policy towards official history on secret matters has also been hidden. It is only now that 
significant  papers on post-war intelligence history are being released into the public domain. New 
materials, available under the Open Government Initiative, offer fascinating insights into the 
attitudes of historians and officials to the issue of how Britain's secret past should be narrated.  
Several conclusions are drawn in this essay. First, Governments were able to hide 
substantial secrets after 1945 and expended considerable resources in offering their own carefully 
packaged versions of the past in order to maintain secrecy. Officials succeeded in keeping 
Whitehall's most important secrets – codebreaking and deception – by managing the first wave of 
post-war memoirs and official history. This effort was successful in cloaking the breaking of the 
German Enigma code machine, and other German systems, by an army of cipher experts and former 
academics at Bletchley Park- an achievement known as the Ultra secret - for much longer than they 
thought possible. Second, the major assaults on post-war secrecy were not launched by 'outsiders' 
but by  'insiders'.  Memoir writers, rather than enterprising journalists and historians have been the 
shock troops that have rolled back the frontiers of secrecy, and in particular 'insiders' who were able 
to exercise political influence and status to further their objectives. Third, as secrecy began to erode, 
Whitehall was increasingly convinced that official history was a useful way of managing the past, 
offering a judicious mixture of concession and control. By the late 1950s, the authorities had 
embarked on their own programme of official history, beginning with M.R.D. Foot's history of SOE 
in France, intended as an experimental ‘pilot project’, charting the way for a whole fleet of further 
SOE official histories. These would provide an opportunity to set the record straight on various 
sensitive wartime issues. Fourth, during the 1950s and the 1960s, decisions to move forward on the 
writing of official history of wartime secret service were partly driven by the Cold War. SOE in 
France was intended mostly to address troublesome wartime controversies, but it was also intended 
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to counter the widely-held view that most of the effective resistance to the Nazis in Europe had been 
organised by the Communists. More importantly, the decision to embark on the Hinsley official 
intelligence history in the late 1960s was driven by a strong desire to restore the reputation of British 
intelligence and security which had been battered by revelations of Soviet infiltration into British 
intelligence. In 1968, ‘molemania’ was unleashed by the publication of My Silent War, the 
mischievous memoirs of KGB agent Kim Philby who had penetrated Britain's Secret Intelligence 
Service (SIS). The British public were rather taken by Kim Philby's irreverent writings, which 
portrayed British intelligence as bunglers. For the first time perhaps, Whitehall had to focus on the 
question of how to manage the image of secret service. 
Finally, throughout this process, Whitehall achieved something of a learning curve in the 
management of official history, partly through the long service of a few individuals, including 
Harold Wilson’s Cabinet Secretary, Burke Trend. Trend's influence was important, positive and 
benign. Anxious to see the achievements of British secret service accurately recorded, Trend 
believed that an imaginative solution could reconcile effective secrecy with admirable and 
informative history.  Institutionalised learning has been possible partly because the business of 
'policing the past' has extended from the end of the Second World War through to the early twenty-
first century. The Open Government Initiative marked a major step-change in the management of 
secrecy in the 1990s. This process has continued, and on 18 December 2002, the British authorities 
announced their appointment of an official historian of MI5 (the Security Service) to undertake a 
history of the service from 1909 to 2009, to be published on its centenary.4  
 
 
Even as the Second World War ended, the resistance organisations in many European countries 
were determined to publish their own exploits, which had been ingeniously assisted by Britain's 
wartime sabotage organisation, the Special Operations Executive (SOE). British officials were 
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disappointed by this breach of secrecy, but they should not have been surprised. Public claims about 
resistance to Nazi ideas and oppression were part of the rehabilitation process in many occupied 
countries and were also a crucial platform for some of the first initiatives in the area of European 
unification.5  By the early 1950s, a growing number of figures who had worked with SOE's 
American sister service, the Office of Strategic Services, had written their memoirs. Special 
operations or ‘covert action’ have always been notoriously difficult to keep hidden. Unlike the 
gathering of intelligence, which is largely passive, special operations are often 'noisy'. They are 
intrinsically insecure and can require the recruitment of large numbers of people from unchecked 
backgrounds and involve co-operation with diverse foreign resistance organisations. Accordingly, 
the end of the Second World War was quickly followed by a litany of memoirs concerning 
resistance and SOE.6
 To the general public this might have suggested that, now that the war was over, the stories 
of its clandestine activity could be freely told. But in reality the most important aspects of the secret 
conflict with Germany - codebreaking and deception - remained hidden. Only in the early 1970s, 
more than three decades after the end of the Second World War, did the story of Ultra and Bletchley 
Park, the mammoth technical effort which defeated the German Enigma cypher machine, burst 
upon a surprised world, accompanied by the story of wartime deception. Thereafter, much of the 
strategic and operational history of the Second World War had to be rewritten. Before the 1970s, 
one of the most important aspects of the Second World War, the fact that many of the operational 
intentions of the Axis had been transparent to the Allies, had been methodically airbrushed from 
historical writing.7
 This ‘airbrushing’ was a carefully orchestrated process. Before the end of the war, Britain's 
most senior intelligence official, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, chairman of the Joint Intelligence 
Committee or 'JIC', turned his mind to the problem of the management of the past. British records 
were certainly not a threat. Many would be burnt at the end of the war and others could remain 
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under lock and key for decades. But in the summer of 1944, with the invasion of France under way, 
Italian, Japanese and German records were spilling out into the open from embassies and 
headquarters in the chaos of Axis retreat.8 Gradually, it dawned on the authorities that some of the 
most hidden aspects of the war were now in danger of seeping into the public domain. If Allied and 
Axis decisions were compared, side by side, then historians would then realise that the prescience 
and speed of decision achieved by Allied commanders could have been secured through only  the 
use of what was euphemistically called 'special intelligence'. Some of the innermost secrets of the 
war - the successes of Ultra and the remarkable efforts of secret deception teams that helped to mask 
the D-Day invasion - might soon be revealed.  
 GCHQ, the new post-war name given to the codebreaking organisation based at Bletchley 
Park, was foremost in pressing for the tightest secrecy. The breaking of enemy codes and cyphers, 
known as signals intelligence or 'sigint' was, in their view, best hidden forever. The mysteries of 
sigint had to be carefully protected for use against 'future enemies', who were already massing on 
the horizon in 1945. There were also potential problems with the German acceptance of defeat. 
GCHQ argued that if it became known that the Allies had been using Ultra to read Hitler's Enigma 
communications, the Germans were likely to use it as an excuse to say that they were 'not well and 
fairly beaten'. The dangerous but attractive myths of 'defeat by betrayal' that had circulated in 
Germany after 1918 and which had been seized on by embryonic fascist parties, might surface once 
more.9  
 Even before the war had ended, the London Signals Intelligence Board, Britain's highest 
'sigint' authority, had convened a special committee to examine the problem of how to handle 
history and historians. By July 1945 they had suggested what became the standard Whitehall 
remedy. Simply to lock these secrets up was not enough; instead, positive information control was 
required. The public would soon demand a detailed and authoritative narrative of the war and 
something substantial had to be put in place. Official historians should be recruited and 
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indoctrinated into Ultra and then ordered not to 'betray' it in their writings. Then a further body had 
to be created to review their work and also to sanitize the memoirs of senior figures who had known 
about Ultra.10 Strategic deception was also a subject which the secret services wished to see hidden 
forever.11 No mention of strategic deception and the turning of German agents by MI5 was 
permitted in the public history that emerged prior to 1972.12   
 By the end of July 1945 the leading lights of British intelligence were increasingly 
conscious of the complexity of the history problem and were beginning to recognise the scale of the 
managerial project before them. Large areas of the past would have to be controlled if important 
secret methods were to be protected and embarrassments avoided. The problem was passed to the 
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the main Whitehall forum for the discussion of high-level 
intelligence issues. On the last day of July 1945 they discussed the issue of 'The Use of Special 
Intelligence by Historians' and warned the Chiefs of Staff that it was ‘imperative that the fact that 
such intelligence was available should NEVER be disclosed'. But sealing this subject, even for a 
few years, seemed almost impossible. As GCHQ had already realised, when intelligent historians 
got busy, 'the comparing of the German and British documents is bound to arouse suspicion in their 
minds that we succeeded in reading the enemy cyphers'. What would tip them off was the speed of 
Allied reactions to Axis moves. London and Washington had based most of their strategy and 
operations upon masses of information that 'could not have been received from agents or other 
means slower than Special Intelligence'.  
 Official historians would be needed to work actively with the authorities on official accounts 
in order to disguise Ultra and were asked to sign a document referring specifically to the need to 
hide special intelligence in the writing of their history.13 Moreover, the tens of thousands of 
intelligence personnel who worked on Ultra and deception would have to be bound by an iron code 
of secrecy. Retiring ministers, generals and diplomats would also have to be exhorted to remove all 
mention of these things from their memoirs. Meanwhile the official history programme would 
 7
become the last deception operation of the Second World War, with the objective of covering the 
tracks of sigint and of deception itself.14 By November 1947 this apparatus was in place, when the 
JIC reported that several official naval histories were under way and noted that a system for having 
their product ‘screened’ by the Naval Intelligence Department had been created.15  
 Churchill was already at work on his own semi-autobiographical account of the war, which 
would prove to be the best-selling history of the post-war decade. This too had to be security 
screened. Like so many ex-Prime Ministers before and after him, Churchill considered himself 
'licensed to thrill' and less bound that ordinary mortals by official secrecy. Together with Chester 
Wilmott's The Struggle for Europe, Churchill's account of the Second World War was probably the 
primary text in shaping the understanding of the first generation of Second World War historians.16 
Churchill needed no guidance on the need to avoid mentioning Ultra and deception. However, a 
new aspect of the memoir security problem became clear when Churchill decided to include the text 
of telegrams to figures such as Stalin, Roosevelt and Truman. This raised the immediate problem of 
cipher security, for verbatim texts could, in theory at least, compromise much of the other British 
cipher traffic sent on the same day. GCHQ worried that the published text of a telegram could 
provide a 'crib' that would allow the Russians a way into a volume of traffic sent in a secure cipher 
system.17 Accordingly, the Chief of SIS, Sir Stewart Menzies had dinner with Churchill on the 
night of 9 June 1948 and explained the problem. Menzies tried to 'tie him down' to a formal 
arrangement for changes. Churchill was 'not impressed' by the arguments but he agreed to 
paraphrase the quoted telegrams.18  
 For all these measures to be effective it was necessary to co-ordinate with the Americans 
and the Commonwealth.19 By March 1946, Colonel Wingate of the London Controlling Section, 
the main wartime deception centre, had achieved agreement with the Americans over the redrafting 
of Eisenhower's final report on the Overlord operation to avoid any reference to deception. London 
was appalled to see that deception had appeared in the first draft and the Chiefs of Staff were asked 
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to make additional high-level representations 'to stop the rot spreading any further'. The same group 
also had to get to work on the memoirs of Eisenhower's aide, Captain Harry Butcher, who 
eventually published My Three Years with Eisenhower in 1946, but only after it had been 'toned 
down' to suggest that deception was a minor tactical matter.20  Guy Liddell, Deputy Director 
General of MI5, was keen that they should discover which Commonwealth countries were 
proposing to produce official histories. The London Signals Intelligence Board began contacting its 
Commonwealth counterparts about the issue. In March 1948, Lt. Commander Williams, the 
Chairman of the New Zealand Signals Intelligence Committee, assured them that they were 
following the London line. The JIC also produced a new directive for ‘Chief Historians’ on the 
safeguarding of special intelligence.21 The successors to the London Controlling Section continued 
requesting press restrictions into the 1950s to prevent any public mention of their wartime deception 
activities.22
 Not all official historians were happy about these restrictions. Reportedly, the naval 
historians Stephen Roskill and Arthur Marder fulminated against them. In both their official and 
unofficial capacities they were in regular contact with senior intelligence officers who had handled 
Ultra and were aware of the extent to which the history of the Second World War was being 
circumscribed by the need to maintain secrecy. However, they accepted it. The person who came 
closest to sounding the alarm was Sir Herbert Butterfield. Ten years after the war he issued a 
strident warning about such official history. Well-connected, but ultimately denied an opportunity to 
join the privileged ranks of the official historians, Butterfield in all probability knew about the Ultra 
secret. He warned: 'I must say that I do not personally believe that there is a government in Europe 
which wants the public to know the truth'. He then explained how the mechanisms of secrecy and 
government claims of 'openness' worked in tandem. 'Firstly, that governments try to press upon the 
historian the key to all the drawers but one, and are very anxious to spread the belief that this single 
one contains no secret of importance: secondly, that if the historian can only find out the thing 
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which the government does not want him to know, he will lay his hands on something that is likely 
to be significant.'  In retrospect, this is clearly a comment on Ultra as the ‘missing dimension’ of the 
official histories of the war.  It also stands as a salutary warning to scholars working in the wake of 
any major conflict who feed only upon material available from official sources.23
 Britain's top intelligence officials were always pessimistic about maintaining the secrecy of 
Ultra in the long term, believing that their elaborate scheme would not survive sustained scrutiny. 
Any intelligent comparison of say, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's moves in the Western Desert, 
with the response of his opponent, General Bernard Montgomery and the Eighth Army, would give 
the game away, pointing to a break in Axis communications traffic. Moreover, the story of Magic, 
the breaking of Japanese diplomatic codes, had been unveiled by the Americans as early as 1946 in 
their public investigation into Pearl Harbor.24  London was dismayed by this latter revelation, for 
surely an enterprising historian would soon ask about the security of German codes?  
 The twin secrets of Ultra and of organised deception were not entirely watertight. One of the 
first to break the silence was Duff Cooper, one of Churchill's senior Ministers. So often, Whitehall 
secrecy was frustrated by senior statesmen who behaved as if they were above the law – as in 
practice they were - for no-one was going to prosecute Winston Churchill or his circle under the 
Official Secrets Act. In 1950,  Duff Cooper, who had been Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 
(1941-3), wrote a lightly fictionalised and alarmingly accurate account of a wartime deception 
operation developed by MI5.25 His 'novel' narrated the core of the now famous story of 'Operation 
Mincemeat', in which a dead body was dropped into the sea by submarine off the coast of Spain, 
carrying misleading plans about D-Day.  
 Duff Cooper’s breach annoyed the authorities and infuriated others who had been banned 
from writing about the operation, including the journalist Ian Colvin. Ewen Montagu, a Naval 
Intelligence officer and the key figure in the deception apparatus, who had overseen the operation, 
found it intolerable. Montagu responded by making persistent and ingenious use of the Duff Cooper 
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breach to obtain permission for his own history of the operation, entitled The Man Who Never Was 
published in 1953. This was made into a film with the same title in 1956. In the preface to his 
account, Montagu gives the impression that the authorities wanted him the write the book to correct 
previous accounts, a veiled reference to Duff Cooper.26 But the authorities did not want further 
material in the public domain. In reality, Montagu fought a bitter struggle in order to publish by 
pressing the Attorney General to prosecute Duff Cooper. Cooper had been warned not to publish, he 
complained, but had 'flouted these objections' and published, 'relying on his eminent position as 
protection against prosecution'. Cooper was investigated, but no one could discover how he had 
obtained secret reports on 'Mincemeat', and no action was taken. Montagu's own position was 
especially invidious, since Fleet Street had latched onto the idea that Duff Cooper's novel might be a 
real story and was asking him questions. While Duff Cooper enjoyed the pleasure and profit of 
publishing, Montagu was specifically ordered to deny all knowledge, in response to frequent 
newspaper enquiries.27
 By January 1951, as Montagu explained to a friend, he was busy 'putting on pressure that 
they should either allow me to publish or prosecute Duff Cooper'. There had been endless meetings 
with Sir Harold Parker, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, with the Attorney General 
and eventually with the Secretary of State for Defence, Emmanuel Shinwell. 'I have been slogging 
away hard', he added. By March 1951, he had forced 'their capitulation' and was at last allowed to 
publish. All the time, Montagu was fully alert to the commercial possibilities and he provides an 
early example of how the attractions of entrepreneurial publishing proved a key factor in the erosion 
of post-war secrecy. He immediately contacted Life magazine 'who are the best payers of this sort of 
thing'. They had offered him between $2,500 and $3,000, but Montagu suspected that this was their 
starting price and was 'suggesting more'. He was also looking for serialisation in the Sunday Express 
and the possibility of films.28  
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 Montagu was not free to publish everything. John Drew, who headed the British post-war 
deception organisation, underlined the fact that were 'some points' which he still could not reveal. 
Deception was intimately connected with the Ultra secret. Montagu had already written a secret 
account of Mincemeat for the MI5 internal history, stressing that evidence from Ultra demonstrated 
that the Germans had 'taken the bait' which had been planted on them. But in the published book 
Ultra was not mentioned, and the idea of an organised programme of strategic deception was also 
obscured, with Mincemeat being presented as a 'wild' one-off caper.29  Others followed in 
Montagu's footsteps and Eddie Chapman, an MI5 deception agent with the codename 'Zig-Zag', 
published his memoir the next year.30 Nevertheless, Ultra and the scale of organised strategic 
deception remained a secret throughout the 1960s. 
 The spell of secrecy was not broken until the early 1970s. In 1972, J.C. Masterman 
published his memoir of organised strategic deception, The Doublecross System. Masterman was an 
Oxford historian who, as a wartime MI5 officer, had run the committee controlling wartime 
deception operations. In the late 1960s he had shown a typescript history of Doublecross to Michael 
Howard who was an official historian, but who knew nothing about strategic deception. Both were 
agreed that while this dimension remained missing, 'all histories of the war would be not only 
inaccurate but positively misleading'. However, at the time the security services were threatening 
Masterman with prosecution under the Official Secrets Act if this subject was revealed.  
 Masterman managed to persuade Whitehall to relent on its secrecy because he was the 
ultimate 'insider'. He was a governor of the most eminent public schools and a famous amateur 
sportsman. As History tutor at Christ Church he had taught a remarkable number of the 'great and 
the good'. Whitehall's senior inhabitants, and indeed the then Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-
Home, had been taught by him at Oxford. Remarkably, his former students were reluctant to argue, 
regarding themselves as inferior in rank. Michael Howard and Alec Douglas-Home, both Christ 
Church men, fell to talking about this some years later. Douglas-Home recalled: 
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Let me tell you an extraordinary thing about J.C. [Masterman] … You won't believe 
this, but when I was Foreign Secretary they tried to make me lock him up. They 
actually tried to make me lock him up. It was that book of his. Both MI5 and MI6 were 
determined to stop his publishing it. MI5 pushed it up to the Home Secretary, and he 
pushed it over to me. I squashed it pretty quickly, I can tell you.  Lock up the best 
amateur spin bowler in England? They must have been out of their minds.31
 
MI5 and SIS wanted prosecution because they feared that one thing would lead to another and the 
whole system of secrecy would unravel.  
 In a sense they were correct, for intelligence and deception were closely intertwined and 
although Masterman did not reveal the Ultra, this was soon trumpeted by Frederick Winterbotham's 
The Ultra Secret, a memoir which began to tell the story of the codebreakers at Bletchley Park. In 
his foreword to Winterbotham's book, Sir John Slessor, a former Chief of the Air Staff, remarked 
that the ban on references to Ultra had exercised 'an inhibiting effect on the writing of military 
history in every field' which he had been pressing, unsuccessfully, to get lifted for twenty years. In 
the event, independent historians were led by the nose and had not detected these secret things. 
Instead the British public had been informed by 'insiders' with friends in high places, or by the 'great 
and the good' who regarded themselves as invulnerable to prosecution.32
 The Whitehall decision not to oppose publication on Ultra by Winterbotham was not uni-
causal. Its appearance was certainly resisted by many inside intelligence in the early 1970s, but 
others in government felt that this revelation was a necessary counterblast to the damage done the 
reputation of the British secret service during the late 1960s by figures such as Kim Philby.33 The 
attitude of GCHQ to the release of Ultra is particularly interesting. It has been suggested that the 
Ultra secret was not just becoming more widely known, but was actually physically "wearing out". 
One of the reasons that the Allies wished to keep the Ultra secret was that German Enigma 
machines and similar machines were still in service around the world in the diplomatic communities 
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of various Third World countries - especially Africa - and were happily being read by Britain and 
the United States. But these venerable 'pre-owned' Enigma machines, being electromechanical, had 
a limited life span. By the 1970s, machines that had whirred on into the post-war period were being 
replaced. The specific value of hiding their insecurity from their post-war owners was declining 
fast.34
 Moreover, the authorities had concluded that these secrets would soon be uncovered by 
others and could not longer be meaningfully protected. There had already been some public 
discussion of Ultra in Poland and France. At the time that Winterbotham was working on The Ultra 
Secret, the writer Anthony Cave Brown was well advanced with Bodyguard of Lies, which dealt at 
length with Churchill, Ultra and D-Day deception matters. This appeared one year later, in 1975, 
published by Harper in New York.35 Anthony Cave Brown, a seasoned journalist who had worked 
as a foreign correspondent for the London Times and the Guardian, had examined many private 
papers in Britain and the United States and had probably uncovered the Ultra secret before 
Winterbotham made it public. Moreover, his energetic activities had been known to the authorities 
for some time. Their initial interest had been triggered some ten years before when a Chiefs of Staff 
paper, borrowed from General Freddie Morgan by Cave Brown was mislaid and then, mysteriously, 
turned up at auction in New York.36 Although Anthony Cave Brown took prompt steps to recover 
the paper and return it to its original custodian, officials were frantic. Subsequently, Freddie Morgan 
was required to turn in all his secret papers to the authorities after a co-ordinated drive by B.A. Hill 
of MI5 and Derek Woods of the Cabinet Office Historical Section. After some persistence, all his 
material was recovered and MI5 expressed the view that this was ‘a very satisfactory conclusion to 
this troublesome matter’.37 Morgan had initially resisted the authorities, but eventually gave way, 
handing over his files while pleading permission to keep one file cover stamped secret as a ‘relic’ of 
his wartime service.38 Officials had now been alerted and in November 1966, William McIndoe of 
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the Cabinet Office Historical Section warned other officials that Anthony Cave Brown ‘needs to be 
watched like a hawk’.39   
 Controlling private papers proved a growing problem for the authorities in the early 1960s. 
Historians and journalists like Anthony Cave Brown had identified the papers of “insiders” - 
particularly those at the top - as an ideal way to uncover secrets. Some of these retired senior figures 
proved to be extremely truculent when asked to hand over papers. Although official papers properly 
belonged to HMG, distinguished figures were nevertheless determined to retain them, often for the 
purpose of writing their memoirs.40 Michael Howard was required to deal with these knotty 
problems during the setting up of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives. In 1964, he spoke 
to Derek Woods of the Cabinet Office Historical Section about the possibility of having the 
archivist (who they proposed to appoint) ‘screened’, so that he could deal with classified papers.41  
 What was the attitude of the Cabinet Office to the setting up of archival centres which were 
dedicated to the study of recent and contemporary history and busily seeking to acquire collections 
of private papers? Such places were problematic, being a kind of mezzanine floor, situated halfway 
between secrecy and openness. To the official mind, the best situation was clearly to have all secret 
papers under lock and key in government departments. But if secret papers were floating about in 
private hands, it seemed better that they be deposited in such centres, with which government 
enjoyed a working relationship, than not to be policed at all. The issue was illuminated when Sir 
John Slessor, wartime RAF commander in the Middle East, asked for government permission to 
deposit his papers, which contained many copies of official documents, at the Liddell Hart Centre 
for Military Archives. Had Slessor simply given his papers to the Centre, the authorities would have 
reluctantly accepted this as a fait accompli.  But as Slessor had formally asked permission 
beforehand, they felt better able to refuse. Ideally, they wanted his official papers to be ‘where they 
ought to be’ and that was ‘in official custody’. In parenthesis, Derek Woods of the Cabinet Office 
offered the MoD a clear statement of how he viewed the Liddell Hart Centre: 
 15
 
The fact is that our understanding with the centre is simply in the nature of a long-
stop, to ensure that if any official papers have escaped the official net without our 
knowledge and should come into the centre’s hands, they will be properly looked 
after. In a perfect world no doubt the Trustees ought to be required to hand over 
any such papers that come into their possession. But it is difficult to take butter 
from a dog’s mouth and we have accepted the arrangements as a reasonable 
compromise. It would be quite a different matter and, I am sure, altogether wrong 
for us to feed the dog ourselves.42   
 
One could not wish for a clearer statement of purpose. However, in this particular case, the history 
police moved at a constabulary pace and their quarry escaped, at least for a while. Slessor retained 
his papers and refused to hand them to the MoD. They afterwards found their way into the RAF 
Museum at Hendon, apparently unsifted. Full of interesting material, some of which pertained to 
post-war intelligence, they were open to scholars there for some time in the mid-1980s. However, a 
few years later, the MoD became aware of this, and the Slessor papers were then transferred to the 
Air Historical Branch at the MoD.  In the mid-1990s the papers were weeded and then placed in the 
Public Record Office.43
 
  
In stark contrast to Ultra, the SOE story was already seeping into the public domain at the end of 
the Second World War and certainly the existence of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) 
was not itself secret after the spring of 1945. During the late 1940s and through the 1950s a 
number of memoirs were published by those associated with SOE or its American sister service 
OSS. Indeed, to the dismay of some in Whitehall, OSS had embarked on a semi-official policy of 
publicising its achievements at the end of the war, through both books and films, in a futile effort 
to prolong its existence. Many resistance leaders in Europe were also writing the history of their 
 16
national efforts, and in both France and the Netherlands there was concerted interest in 
discovering more about networks that had been penetrated by the Germans.44
 The British government response had nevertheless been one of stonewalling. In 1949, 
urged on by Ian Fleming (a Naval Intelligence officer, who would soon pen his first James Bond 
novel) Major General Sir Colin Gubbins, the wartime head of SOE, asked for official permission 
to write a public history of SOE.45 To his disappointment the Foreign Office forbade this.46 
HMG also offered only limited co-operation with foreign endeavours, official or otherwise. This 
was illustrated by a Dutch parliamentary enquiry into a disastrous episode known as the 
'Englandspiel', wherein radio security problems had worked to the advantage of the Gestapo and 
subsequently numbers of agents had been dropped into German hands.47
Stonewalling failed to deter determined writers. Numerous memoirs and biographies of 
SOE operatives, mostly about France or published in France, appeared in the first post-war 
decade.48 Officials became more concerned in 1958, when public controversy erupted over 
accusations about the penetration of SOE networks by the Germans, including the Paris-based 
PROSPER network. New high-profile books about the deaths of female SOE agents focussed 
attention on the problem of betrayal.49 Dame Irene Ward MP led a campaign in Parliament for 
an enquiry into these SOE failures, inspired in part by claims that the authorities were offering 
little information about deceased agents to family members. During November and December 
1958 the various protagonists had taken to attacking each other in the pages of the press.50 
Finally, Harold Macmillan, who nurtured an intense dislike of public disclosure regarding secret 
service, nevertheless conceded that there should be some sort of enquiry.   
Although Macmillan's concession to Irene Ward had been made with reluctance, official 
attitudes were changing. By 1958 there was a growing conviction on the part of officials in the 
Cabinet Office and the Foreign Office that some ’counter-blast’ was required against the flood of 
'outsider' histories dealing with SOE, some of which were inaccurate and sensationalist. In early 
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1959, preliminary discussions were under way in Whitehall about a possible official history of 
SOE. An internal secret history of SOE already existed, written by W.J.M. Mackenzie of 
Magdalen College, Oxford, covering most areas of SOE activity other than the Far East. But the 
Cabinet Office considered that for security reasons, publishing this history was out of the 
question and indeed they were anxious to keep its existence a secret. A different sort of history 
would be required for public consumption.51 The Cabinet Office noted that some people were 
now suggesting that SOE records were being kept secret ‘in order to shield people who ought to 
be brought to book’ for incompetence regarding the penetration of the PROSPER network. 
Meanwhile, they argued, the absence of any official information about the role of SOE was 
creating ‘bad impressions’ on the Continent, because Britain was not receiving due credit for 
helping the resistance. The Foreign Office had appointed an Adviser to answer questions of fact 
about SOE, but more was needed. Discussions were complicated by departmental funding.  The 
growing cost of the mainstream official war history programme, begun in the late 1940s, was 
already a problem. The Cabinet Office clearly hoped to transfer to the Foreign Office the 
expense of any future SOE history, given that some of its rationale involved Britain’s profile in 
Europe.52   
The Cabinet Office deputed the co-ordination of the SOE history issue to a rising star in 
the Treasury, Burke Trend. By May 1959, Trend was heading a working party which met Sir 
Colin Gubbins and two other senior SOE officers, Robin Brook and Richard Barry. Their task 
was to examine what form an SOE history might take and to identify a possible author. All were 
agreed that a history was feasible and desirable. It would remind allies of ‘the indispensable role 
this country had played as a base for their indigenous resistance’, and it would assist in ‘refuting 
current misconceptions’. There was a range of problems to resolve. Matters that were not for 
public airing included ‘currency operations’ and activities that had ‘involved violations of 
neutrality’, and these could simply be omitted. More delicate was the inevitable assessment or 
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implied assessment of personal responsibility for failures, ‘in particular the breakdown and 
penetration by the enemy of resistance organisations through treachery or weakness under 
interrogation’. The history was bound to stir further current public debate over the deaths of 
agents in France and Holland.53  
Trend’s working party identified two possible routes forward. One was a ‘pilot project’ 
dealing with one field in detail - ‘probably France’ - on the grounds that this was ‘at once the 
most difficult subject, the most controversial and the most highly publicised’. This involved 
some risk, but such a project seemed a good way of gauging whether a history of more of  SOE’s 
activities would be possible. The safer alternative was to commission a public version of the 
existing outline secret history of SOE by W.J.M. Mackenzie. In May 1959, Mackenzie, who was 
part of Trend's working party, argued vigorously for this. Possible authors were also identified, 
including William Deakin at St Antony’s College, Oxford, and Philip Williams at Nuffield 
College, Oxford, and officials decided to open discussions with those two colleges to obtain 
further advice.54  Although the outline history option was safer, it did not meet the growing 
desire of officials to set the record straight on France. Accordingly Burke Trend favoured the 
French option.  
While officials deliberated at length, the pace of erosion of secrecy increased. Although 
Bletchley Park remained hidden from public view, in the early 1960s books began to appear that 
dealt with SIS (often known as MI6) as well as SOE. Perhaps most important was the appearance 
of Montgomery Hyde's The Quiet Canadian, which dealt with the work of Sir William 
Stephenson, the Canadian controller of British Security Co-ordination (BSC) in New York. This 
was a large office run by SIS, in which most other British secret services also enjoyed 
representation. In October 1962, the serialisation of this book prior to publication triggered 
anxiety in Whitehall. Burke Trend met the Chairman of JIC, the Chief of SIS (Dick White) and 
another SIS officer, to discuss the problem. As in previous cases, life was made more difficult by 
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the collaboration of “insiders”. Hyde had received some co-operation from at least one serving 
SIS officer and this rendered the authorities all but powerless. When MI5 and the Director of 
Public Prosecutions had reviewed the possibility of banning The Quiet Canadian, it was clear 
that a court might well take this SIS assistance as official concurrence in publication. The issue 
was made more difficult by Sir William Stephenson’s peculiar status. Although BSC had 
received funds from SIS and other British secret services that it had represented nevertheless, 
Stephenson, a wealthy businessman 'had not been paid by HMG for his wartime activity as head 
of British Security Co-ordination in New York’. As result Stephenson’s line of responsibility to 
HMG was 'tenuous and difficult to define’. This unofficial publication by Hyde, dealing with SIS 
without clearance, and which had escaped prosecution, set a worrying precedent. Trend was sure 
that this book would provoke awkward questions from MPs and encourage other writers.55 
Subsequently, Sir Dick White despatched one of his officers to talk to Hyde about how it had 
come to be researched and published. Hyde explained that he had not felt it necessary to seek 
clearance from government, because he had not used official British sources. His book was about 
Stephenson, a Canadian, not about British intelligence. Yet there was no doubt that he had 
enjoyed assistance from inside SIS.56  
 Trend was particularly worried about questions from MPs because of the small but vocal 
group of parliamentarians who were pressing tirelessly for the opening up of secret history, 
especially SOE. On 13 December 1962, Dame Irene Ward MP met the Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan. She complained that she could not understand why the work on a history of SOE was 
being blocked, while Hyde had been allowed to publish The Quiet Canadian without any action 
being taken against him. Macmillan replied that it was all the result of confusion, with Hyde 
believing he had clearance, when in fact he did not. Ward was too well informed to be taken in 
by this and shot back that she was ‘quite convinced that Mr Montgomery Hyde was never under 
misapprehension and knew exactly what he was doing’.57
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Within months, Whitehall was dealing with a new book on MI5 written by John Bulloch, 
a journalist on the Daily Telegraph, and published by Arthur Baker Ltd.  Once again the 
authorities seemed remarkably powerless. On 5 March 1963, Roger Hollis, Director General of 
MI5, informed Trend that little or nothing could be done about the book, partly because much of 
it was not based on official documents. Although the book contained many inaccuracies, it 
nevertheless gave a ‘reasonably clear picture of the work and methods of the Security Service,’ 
and its relationship with the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police. Hollis was in no doubt 
that it would give the KGB, other hostile intelligence services, and the Communist Party, 'a 
clearer idea of our functions and methods than they have hitherto had.’ 
Hollis asserted that he had done what he could to prevent publication or to have the 
damaging passages removed, but to no avail. The book drew on private papers, notably the diary 
of Vernon Kell, the first Director-General of MI5, rather than upon official papers. In the event 
the publishers were asked to consider removing a few sensitive passages and an offer was made 
to cover the expenses of resetting parts of the book.58 Subsequently, Harold Macmillan was 
informed that officials had held a ‘reasonably amicable’ meeting with the author and the 
publisher, who were willing to make amendments to seven passages. There would now be no 
damaging disclosures, the officials adding their view that it was in any case 'helpful' that some 
material in the book was inaccurate. The officials brightly concluded that the final version of the 
book was now ‘rather dull’. The cost of the typesetting changes was to be met ‘from Security 
Service funds’.59
It was against this background that HMG reversed its policy of secrecy on SOE. In 1962 
it decided to go ahead with the 'pilot project' for a remarkably detailed history of SOE in France. 
Pressure from MPs and the ongoing erosion of secrecy were the main reasons, but another was 
anti-communism. Reviewing the decision shortly after publication, the Foreign Office asserted 
that an important purpose was to stake Britain’s claim to ownership of resistance. They wished 
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‘to correct the impression being spread at that time that the Communists alone amongst the allies 
had given real support to indigenous resistance movements in captured territories in Europe, 
including France after the collapse of that country’s military effort in 1940.’ Officials also 
wished to counter a rising tide of sensationalism generated by 'outsider' history. There was a 
desire to ‘restore the balance of truth’ and to put some of the wilder stories in their proper 
context. Supposedly, the formal decision to go ahead with SOE in France was taken by R.A. 
Butler on 6 April 1964 and announced in Parliament in response to a question by Dame Irene 
Ward a week later.60 In reality, preliminary work had begun in secret as early as 1960. M.R.D. 
Foot’s magisterial history, SOE in France was published by HMSO in 1966. Most scholars 
greeted the book with acclaim, and it is still regarded by historians as a remarkable history of 
special operations. Foot's achievements were all the more impressive given that he had not 
himself been allowed to browse the disorderly mess that passed for the SOE archive and instead 
had sat at a distance, requesting files, which did not always arrive. More importantly, he was 
forbidden to speak to many of the surviving participants, which was clearly a serious mistake on 
the part of the authorities.61
However, as Trend had warned as early as 1959, to write a detailed history of SOE in 
France was deliberately to send an experimental ship into what were known to be uncharted 
waters. Foot was the ideal author, even recommended by others, such as James Joll, who had 
also been approached as possible authors. Foot had been an intelligence officer with the Special 
Air Service, had worked alongside the Resistance in France after D-Day and had been taken 
prisoner.62 Prior to publication, Colin Gubbins had read every line of Foot's manuscript in draft. 
He had worried that some of the comments were rather 'personal' and that there was implied 
'derogation' of the SOE operative Odette Sansom. Specifically, he was aware that the issue of her 
torture would be controversial. He commented, 'I think it is unnecessary to speculate on the 
question whether her toe-nails were pulled out or not'. Foot left some of these passages in, 
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arguing that if he ignored such issues, it would 'raise a great deal of bother of the very kind the 
book aims at stopping'.63  Any thorough review of the history of individual operations was 
bound to involve comment on personalities, and Foot's official history did not hesitate to address 
these matters head on. Some of his comments were quite acerbic, and given that the history 
referred to living persons he was not well-served by his editors, who might have advised him to 
be more cautious. On publication there was indeed controversy, which both author and officials 
had fully expected. But there was also legal action, which they had not expected.64  
 Trend had intended Foot’s SOE in France to be a ‘pilot project’, which might well be 
followed by a flotilla of further SOE histories dealing with other countries. What happened to 
these projects that were intended to follow in its wake? In May 1967, a year after Foot's 
publication, the programme was still in the hands of Burke Trend, who chaired a meeting to 
consider additional histories. Trend was joined by officials from the Foreign Office, the Cabinet 
Office, and SIS was represented by Norman Mott, who had once served in SOE's security 
section.  The tide was already turning against further volumes. SOE in France, the meeting 
concluded, ‘was profitable historically, but in certain respects it had proved embarrassing 
politically’. Because the book had been a detailed country study it had named names, resulting in 
two legal actions, costing approximately £10,000. The book had sold well, but the overall costs 
beyond what the book had made were estimated at £40,000. They also worried that further 
volumes would need access to foreign records, which would, generate reciprocal requests by 
foreign official historians for access to SOE records.  
What were possible subjects for further SOE volumes? They agreed that a history of 
SOE's operations in Scandinavia would be the easiest to compile and was the least likely to 
provoke recriminations. The SOE's activities in the Netherlands had been largely revealed in the 
Dutch Parliamentary enquiry, but they worried that a history of SOE in Belgium might spark 
political embarrassment, while a volume on Poland would be difficult to write because the Poles 
 23
had to some extent operated autonomously. A volume on Italy would be feasible, but the history 
of SOE in Greece and Yugoslavia would raise acute political problems. Since North Africa and 
the Middle East had been used chiefly as bases for SOE, the history of operations in those areas 
would be 'exiguous' and therefore deal mainly with the mechanics of control. (Privately, some 
knew the colourful history of HQ SOE Cairo was best avoided.) The Far East could provide 
material for a separate volume. But in the light of the various obstacles and costs, no official was 
keen to advance any more studies. In 1967, the programme was not moving forward.65
Instead, it was pressure from those who had been on the “inside”, but who were now very 
much on the outside, that continued to roll back secrecy. In November 1967 the Sunday Times 
carried a series of detailed articles on Kim Philby. This was followed in 1968 by the publication 
of Philby’s memoirs, My Silent War, offering salacious details about SIS both during the war 
and after. Philby had defected in 1963 and had been dismayed by his indifferent reception in 
Moscow and by his gloomy existence there. But his memoir, intended by the KGB to encourage 
others to follow in his footsteps, betrayed none of this and instead painted a picture of Soviet 
intelligence as, 'an elite force', against the capitalist bunglers of SIS.66 This memoir produced a 
frenzy of newspaper coverage of SIS, hitherto a sensitive subject largely stepped around by 
British newspapers.67 Intelligence matters had been discussed at length in the press and in books 
before 1968. Philby himself had assisted in the ghost-writing of the memoir of a key Soviet agent 
in Britain, Gordon Lonsdale, published in 1965. But Philby's own memoirs excited entirely new 
levels of public interest and set different benchmarks for what might be discussed in the public 
domain. 
In turn this fed the desires of the pressure group of MPs and Ministers who demanded 
more SOE history. After all, if aspects of SIS activity in the Cold War were now in the public 
domain, then surely wartime SOE was relatively safe ground? One of the more active was 
Douglas Dodds-Parker MP. On 13 March 1968, he visited Trend to lobby for further volumes. 
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Dodds-Parker explained that he had been recruited into one of SOE’s precursors in 1938 and had 
been assured on joining that nothing would ever be revealed. So at first he was ’a little disturbed’ 
when the volume on France had appeared, ‘but he now thought this was an excellent book’. 
Trend accepted his point that someone needed to interview survivors who were a diminishing 
company, and to record their recollections.68  
Pressure from MPs and veterans for further SOE volumes continued and in 1969 Trend’s 
committee asked Dame Barbara Salt of the Foreign Office - she herself had served in SOE - to 
re-visit the possibility of further volumes and the quality of the available archives.69 Salt's report 
stated that when the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, had approved the Foot study a decade 
ago, a key purpose was to counter the idea that communism had been the prime factor in driving 
the Resistance. But this myth had now been slain and the value of underlining this seemed 
‘marginal’. Salt also wondered if the recent publicity given to Kim Philby had not diverted 
public interest into ‘more up-to date channels’. Although authors sometimes applied for access to 
the SOE files 'á la Foot’, these requests, she asserted ‘are easily ridden off’. SOE in France had ' 
been admired by many historians’ and had also delighted some ex-members of SOE and the 
public. It was a deeply impressive work, given the extremely disorderly state of the archives. It 
had, however, been ‘bitterly criticised’ by some veterans for giving the names of individuals and 
for passing judgement upon them with some ‘asperity of tone’. Lord Selborne, the last Head of 
SOE, had expressed unhappiness about this; while some SOE hard-liners even believed that SOE 
should remain secret and wanted anyone publishing on SOE to be prosecuted. 
 What was the way forward? Salt looked at the possibility of encouraging a few chosen 
historians to work on SOE, publishing through commercial channels, and giving them some 
access to the archives, albeit with ‘strict safeguards.’ This had the obvious advantages of reduced 
cost to HMG and absence of vulnerability to legal actions. But this was rejected because there 
would be ‘accusations of favouritism’ that would be ‘quite impossible to refute’. Salt warned that 
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down this road lay an 'historical beargarden'. Continuing with further SOE histories along the 
lines of Foot probably meant a series of five volumes with large production costs and the 
additional possibility of further legal action whose costs were open-ended. Therefore Salt’s 
report recommended some sort of single official volume that would be an outline or survey work 
along the lines of the original W.J.M. Mackenzie secret internal history which, being an 
overview, would lack contentious detail or assessment of individuals.70  
 Salt argued that there were innumerable interesting episodes that could still be profitably 
covered in such an outline history. Italy offered a good example of the ‘instructive and 
entertaining material’ that awaited proper treatment: 
 
There is the case of our principal Italian agent, run by the Swiss station from 
1941 until the Armistice in 1943; this man was in fact controlled by the Italians 
who were thus in a position to know almost all of our attempts at penetration 
over this period and to lead SOE to believe that any accidents occurring in the 
Italian economic or military machine were the result of successful British 
sabotage. On the other hand there are many incidents concerning our BLOs 
[British Liaison Officers] which had had but little publicity, yet they show 
these officers not only as gallant but as virtual leaders of the Resistance: their 
example in the training and direction of often brave but totally undisciplined 
partisans whose energies would otherwise have been turned towards internal 
political strife, makes good reading. 
 
Moreover, the basic arrangements under which the armistice with Italy was signed in 1943 
depended on wireless communications through an SOE officer, Squadron Leader Mallaby, who 
had been captured on landing and then released at British request. In February 1945 the same 
SOE operative was again taken prisoner near the frontier with Switzerland and, on the spot, 
made up the story that he had come on a peace mission. This prompted an immediate conference 
with General Karl Wolff, the commander of the German SS troops in Italy. Wolff sent him back 
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to Switzerland with an offer of surrender. Gubbins decided to pass the matter to the Americans, 
who were themselves putting out peace feelers to Wolff. But Salt was also clear that there were 
things that they could not mention. High on this list were the ‘Pickaxe’ operations, which 
involved dropping agents into these areas on behalf of the Soviet NKVD.71 Dick White, who 
had served as the Chief of SIS (1956-68) and who had taken up the newly created post of 
Cabinet Office Intelligence Co-ordinator on 1 April 1968, was also in favour of a new history. 
He thought that a single volume of the Mackenzie sort would  ‘fit in nicely’ with a general 
official history of intelligence in the Second World War that was also being talked about by 
1969.72  
This was the point at which further official SOE history stalled. On 12 September 1969, 
Burke Trend chaired the critical meeting to consider Barbara Salt's report. Most of those in 
attendance were from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Permanent Under Secretary's 
Department (PUSD) which helped to superintend intelligence matters. H.M.N. Hollis represented 
‘Century House’ or SIS.  On one matter the meeting was clear: ‘Generally speaking it was felt 
that never again should there be an official publication on the model of SOE in France, where the 
trouble and expense had arisen over personalities.’ They agreed with Salt's conclusion that the 
best alternative was a broad ‘conspective history’ similar to the Mackenzie history. But there was 
no great enthusiasm for action, and so this option was seen as a ‘reserve position’ in case of 
further pressure from MPs and Ministers for more SOE history. Salt commented that in the 
meantime unofficial accounts by writers such as E.H. Cookridge might well ‘scoop the market’ 
for such a general history. The meeting also looked at the question of the SOE archives. These 
had been put in better order, but many records were still mixed up with ‘current secret 
intelligence files from which they could not be separated’. The only positive decisions taken 
were to continue sorting the archives and to proceed with a small internal supplement to the 
Mackenzie History that would cover the Far East, and which would remain secret.73  
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Accordingly, by 1969 further volumes on SOE had been put on hold. The experimental 
‘pilot project’, SOE in France, had uncovered all sorts of political and legal problems, while the 
anodyne alternative of an outline history raised questions of cost, which some Cabinet Office 
officials were anxious to escape.74  MPs, including Dodds-Parker, continued to press for more 
SOE history during 1970 and 1971 but were deflected with standard answers about the issue 
being under continual review and disorderly archives being sorted.75 More importantly, Burke 
Trend, the prime mover in all this, was preoccupied with a new project - the official history of 
wartime intelligence – which was eventually undertaken by Harry Hinsley and his team.76
 
 
The 1960s were an era of exposure, in which the British public, hitherto mostly ignorant about 
secret service, was inundated with revelatory material. The decade opened with a series of annual 
dramas: the U-2 spy-plane shoot-down in 1960, the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, the Greville 
Wynne - Oleg Penkovsky affair in 1962, and the Profumo scandal in 1963. Hitherto many 
journalists had been inclined to avoid probing such sensitive issues, partly because they had 
served during the war. A more restless generation of writers was now emerging. 1967 was a 
landmark year with the ‘D-Notice Affair’ in which the journalist Chapman Pincher revealed the 
clandestine British interception of much international telegram traffic, causing the resignation of  
Secretary of the D-Notice Committee. The 'D-Notice' or Defence Notice system, dating back to 
1912, was a voluntary system designed to persuade Fleet Street to keep secret matters of national 
security. In the wake of this affair the D-Notice system was almost scrapped before it was 
rescued by its new secretary, Vice Admiral Sir Norman Denning. The Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson found the 'D-Notice Affair' especially embarrassing.77  Four years previously, Wilson’s 
Labour Party had exploited Macmillan’s discomfiture during the Profumo Scandal and now the 
Conservatives, in opposition, enjoyed binding the boot on the other foot. Most importantly, late 
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1967 brought revelations about Kim Philby, which were the result of an eight-month 
investigation by the Sunday Times Insight team.78 This was crowned by the sensational 
publication of his memoirs in the following year, which dealt in detail with SIS.79 Whitehall's 
attempts to control the Philby story had failed. The Sunday Times had ignored a D-Notice placed 
on the story. It also resisted efforts by Dennis Greenhill of the Foreign Office to persuade the 
editors to print unflattering material about the KGB alongside the Philby material.80 It is hard to 
recapture the sense of shock and outrage felt by some members of the establishment at the public 
parading of these secrets.  Accordingly, by 1968, the expanding flow of 'outsider' books  and 
other revelations about secret service, had concentrated the minds of government on a new 
strategy. 
Whitehall now attempted to swim with the tide. In 1968 HMG amended the pre-existing 
Fifty-Year Rule on access to archives to a Thirty-Year Rule, thereby making imminent the 
release of the records for the Second World War. The decision was taken to release all five years 
of wartime records in one go in 1972. The plan was to follow this soon after with a limited 
release of sigint records, thereby deliberately unveiling the Ultra secret. But by early 1969 there 
was a growing feeling in Whitehall that a bolder gesture was required to allow government to 
recover the initiative and to restore the reputation of the British secret services. Recent 
revelations had not been flattering and morale in the intelligence community had taken a beating. 
The two key movers in this process were Burke Trend and Dick White. Trend was not only 
Wilson's Cabinet Secretary, but also fulfilled the role of friend and confidant of the Prime 
Minister. Trend was also fascinated by intelligence and saw himself as a champion of its cause 
within Whitehall. Meanwhile, Dick White was the official overseer of all of British intelligence. 
Both now felt that disclosures during the 1960s had changed the climate irrevocably, as well as 
dealing a severe blow to the reputation of current British intelligence. They were keen to counter 
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this and urged an accurate and authoritative account of the major contribution made by 
intelligence to the winning of the Second World War.81  
On 26 February 1969 Trend was ready to move forward. He chaired a committee on 
‘Intelligence Activities 1939-45’, which included Dick White, Sir John Rennie (White’s 
replacement as 'C'), Leonard Hooper (Director of GCHQ), Martin Furnival Jones (Director 
General of MI5), Norman Denning from the D Notice Committee and various FCO and MoD 
representatives. Trend argued that a concerted policy on intelligence history was now required: 
 
It seemed to him that a choice must be made between continuing to deal 
individually with each new “outside” book in this field as it appeared (in which 
case the picture in the public mind was built up piecemeal, often inaccurately, 
and often bringing unjustifiable discredit upon those who were involved at the 
time); and, on the other hand, sponsoring an official history which would be 
based on unpublished records and would provide an authoritative account. 
Such an account would be a useful counter-balance to the distorted picture, 
which was now emerging, and enable a more restrictive line to be taken on any 
subsequent requests for access to the records. 
 
All those present were agreed that some sort of officially sponsored history would be ‘valuable’. 
This was partly because the existing official war histories did not take into account the 
importance of intelligence work and in this respect were ‘misleading’. A new project would 
certainly allow them to steer developments, but they also hoped it would be a genuine and 
positive contribution to history. 
 Trend’s committee turned to the practicalities of such a history programme, presuming 
that Ministers could be persuaded of its value. Some of their decisions ‘reflected their experience 
with the production of SOE in France’. They recommended that the work be undertaken by a 
panel of historians, rather than a single author, to ‘reduce the danger of personal rivalry and 
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public dispute’ which a single appointment might generate. The work would have to be cleared, 
but they wanted to ‘afford access to all the available material and then to scrutinise the resulting 
work before publication, rather than attempt to screen the material before access to it was given.’ 
The latter course had been taken with Foot's work on SOE in France. Trend suggested that they 
ask Dick White to prepare a detailed report on the viability of a study covering the war period, 
defined as extending ‘into 1947’. Proposals could then be put to Ministers, to the Leader of the 
Opposition and also to the Committee of Privy Councillors on Official Histories.82  Both Trend 
and White were already committed to this project, but in case others harboured any doubts, 
White’s report spelt out the consequences of inaction: 'Unless plans are laid for the sponsorship 
of an official history, the waters are likely to become increasingly muddy, to the general 
detriment not only of the reputation of British Intelligence but also of security.’83
 Although the outcome that both White and Trend desired was clear, they did not find 
everything plain-sailing. On 12 March 1969, White held a meeting with Maurice Oldfield from 
SIS and representatives of GCHQ and MI5. GCHQ did not oppose such a history outright, 
believing that it should not cause problems so far as revelations of method were concerned. But 
they were anxious on two counts. One was that it might whet the public appetite for yet more 
revelations and ‘generate pressure’ for further projects. The second danger was that a detailed 
history might 'draw attention to the peacetime existence of the service through reference to 
individuals who had served with GCHQ continuously after the war’. GCHQ speculated whether 
the mere release of Sigint records, which was already being planned, was not a preferable course. 
GCHQ also raised the vital matter of consultation with allies. It might be difficult – though not 
necessarily impossible – to get the US National Security Agency to agree to such a history.  
MI5 took a similar line: they were not enthusiastic, but neither would they oppose it. 
What mattered to MI5 was whether a means could be found of writing the history while 
preserving the anonymity of agents. Foot’s SOE in France had named names and this made them 
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nervous. They isolated several problems. First, and most alarming was the possible identification 
of long-term agents by hostile services. Second was the adverse effect on existing agents’ 
morale, since the identity of any agents, past or present, was rightly understood to be highly 
confidential and restricted to a narrow circle. Third was a 'danger that agents whose desire to 
write had previously been restrained by the Official Secrets act would feel little further moral or 
legal restraint concerning publication of their memoirs.’ Again, would this project encourage a 
flood of new material from unauthorised quarters? 
 SIS were no less anxious about agent identification and objected ‘to any mention of SIS 
in such a history’. Given the nature of their work, they were most concerned about the damage to 
‘agent relationship’, insisting that ‘above all the element of trust with agents must be cherished'. 
They added that Law Officers would also be anxious to avoid personal identification ‘in view of 
the experience of libel actions arising from the SOE series’. All three secret services wondered 
about the possibility of producing two different histories, a small one that ‘would be likely to 
make excellent reading and a good impression’, and a more weighty volume of more specialised 
interest that would remain secret and be ‘of real value for the intelligence community’. In part 
this reflected doubts about Trend’s assertion that the wartime story would restore credit to the 
battered reputation of the secret services. They worried that the opposite might be true. If the full 
wartime story was told, the ‘picture of a variety of uncoordinated assessing bodies, and varied 
chains of command in the intelligence organisations would have the reverse of a good public 
relations effect.’ However all three services assured White that they would be prepared to let a 
suitable historian and assistants, once positively vetted,  ‘loose in their archives’.84
 By the summer of 1969 no consensus had emerged. After reviewing White’s report, 
Trend decided to offer Ministers a compromise proposal. Support for a full-scale history was 
weak, so he suggested a 'limited official history’ to be published in some form or other.85  Trend 
sketched out the difference between a limited history that would confine itself to ‘what’ 
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questions, and a full-scale history that would delve into questions of ‘how’. This distinction 
between a ‘what’ history and a ‘how’ history lay at the centre of Dick White’s report. Public 
availability of a ‘how’ history that touched on sources and methods was regarded as anathema. 
Opinion was still sharply divided on whether a more limited ‘what’ history should be made 
authorised. Trend’s advice leant towards publication, arguing that HMG was under constant 
pressure from 'outside' historians for the access to intelligence material ‘to enable them to write 
popular works, for which there is a steady and profitable commercial market’. He also raised the 
D Notice question, a matter which had a deep resonance for Harold Wilson. Trend thought it 
preferable to ‘spare the D Notice system the strain’ that a continued policy of stonewalling 
would create. It was preferable to be proactive 'by publishing our own – accurate but controlled 
account’ rather than always to be on the defensive. However, conceding the multiple anxieties of 
the secret services and the unknown reaction of Washington, Trend advised a middle course. A 
‘what’ history should be commissioned with an open mind as to whether it would be published 
or not, this they could decide having seen how it turned out. The ‘proof of the pudding is in the 
eating’, Trend concluded. On 29 July 1969, Wilson acquiesced: ‘I think I am prepared to agree to 
the proposals … on the basis suggested, namely, keeping the publication option open.' Hinsley's 
official history had begun to edge down the slipway.86
Consultation with the Opposition parties and with allies still lay ahead. Matters did not 
progress speedily. Not until 16 March 1970 did Harold Wilson write to Edward Heath, Leader of 
the Opposition, outlining the plans. He explained that a complete embargo on intelligence history 
was already hard to sustain and the coming release of wartime records would make this task a lot 
harder. Wilson added that a four-part history was envisaged, dealing with strategic intelligence, 
operational intelligence, counter-intelligence and strategic deception. No decision on publication 
would be taken at this stage. The authors who were being born in mind for the four volumes 
were, respectively, Peter Calvocoressi, F.H. Hinsley, J.M.A. Gwyer and Peter Fleming. Heath 
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then consulted with the former Prime Ministers Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan, together 
with Oliver Lyttelton,  and all had ‘serious doubts’. Given the scale of the work envisaged and 
the impossibility of keeping the project secret, there must be a ‘strong presumption' that it would 
be published. This, would be acceptable only if the history excluded the ‘sources and the 
methods and techniques of intelligence gathering’. But none of the elder statesmen could see 
how this could be done. Heath did not offer an unqualified negative, but suggested that these 
objections were cogent and needed more thought. By contrast, Jeremy Thorpe, Leader of the 
Liberal Party, readily endorsed the project.87
 Trend clearly saw Heath’s objections as a serious obstacle. He arranged for Dick White 
to discuss the matter personally with Heath to try and allay his concerns. But on the day that 
White was supposed to meet Heath, the date of the next General Election was announced and the 
meeting was abandoned. By November 1970, Heath had succeeded Wilson as Prime Minister 
and Trend found himself in the position of having to sell the idea to Heath as his Cabinet 
Secretary. Trend re-emphasised the validity of White’s distinction between ‘what’ and ‘how’, 
arguing that the proposed history would concentrate on users of intelligence, rather than on 
intelligence sources. Secret sources could be further protected by ‘a special set of partially 
anonymous references’. Meanwhile, he insisted, the current policy of stonewalling was simply 
not working. This was the moment at which government officials  were  fighting a losing battle 
to prevent Masterman publishing his account of Doublecross. Trend noted: 'It is arguable that we 
should do better to try and anticipate developments of this kind'. Richard Helms, Director of the 
CIA, had already been consulted. He had raised no objection and asked merely to be kept 
informed. Trend assured Heath that he was sure that this was the right course, although in the 
light of the doubts that Heath had expressed in opposition, it was only right that it should be 
submitted to him ‘de novo’ for his consideration.88
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 Trend’s trump card was Dick White. On 19 February 1971, Heath met White and the 
resulting decision was to proceed. Discussions were then opened with potential authors, 
beginning with Peter Fleming.89 All the services regarded this as an important enterprise and 
gave it high level attention. Given that the project had a strong emphasis on sigint, Leonard 
Hooper, Director of GCHQ, initially decided to attend the Steering Committee in person, with 
Bill Millward as his alternate. Clearly there would be issues of detail ahead, but Trend and White 
had got their way and Hinsley’s Official History of Intelligence during the Second World War 
was now in progress.90  
 
The five volumes produced by the Hinsley and his team appeared between 1979 and 1990 and 
were met with acclaim by the public and by academic historians.91 The depth of their research 
was self-evident and they went a substantial way to filling the gap left in the history of the 
Second World War by the previous policy of concealing Ultra.92  Although there were criticisms 
of the decision not to name individuals, this was regarded as essential by officials because 
organisations such as SIS would not countenance a history without such reassurances. Moreover, 
anonymity guarded against the threat of legal action. The appearance of these volumes was not 
entirely trouble free. When completed they required official clearance. Perhaps angered by the 
unmasking of Anthony Blunt, 'the Fourth Man', in November 1979, Margaret Thatcher forbade 
the publication of any further volumes in the series. As a result, Michael Howard’s volume on 
deception and Antony Simkins's volume on MI5 were held back for almost a decade.93 The 
Thatcher era was a legendary period of Whitehall secrecy. Wesley Wark has captured the surreal 
nature of this historical  'Never-Never Land’ in his essay on official records policy.94   
During the period 1986-8, Thatcher’s policy on intelligence memoirs was famously 
defined by the ‘Spycatcher Affair’ in which Peter Wright, an MI5 officer, battled to publish  
recollections of his 'molehunting' activities in Whitehall and Westminster. Wright attempted to 
 35
publish overseas and was resisted by HMG, with the British Cabinet Secretary to making an 
unsuccessful attempt to defend a policy of blanket secrecy in the Australian courts. Meanwhile, 
HMSO's publishing programme was in the doldrums and a decision was taken to approve two 
‘privatised’ official histories of SOE which were produced commercially by Oxford University 
Press.  These volumes were written by Charles Cruickshank, an ex-Foreign Office official, and 
dealt with Scandinavia and the Far East. The subjects selected recalled the Salt Report of 1969, 
which had identified the Far East for treatment by an internal history to fill a gap in the 
Mackenzie History (undertaken in the 1970s). Salt had also identified Scandinavia as pleasingly 
'uncontroversial'. This assumption now proved wrong for the Cruickshank histories were a pale 
shadow of SOE in France and Scandinavian historians went so far as to attack the study of SOE 
in Scandinavia in the pages of The Times. The Far East volume was no less disappointing and 
some saw privatisation as a retrograde step.95 Nevertheless, officials felt vindicated in their 
decision to look for a commercial outlet, thus avoiding government burdens of legal liability, 
when court action soon forced the withdrawal of the Far East volume from sale in the United 
States.96
 The end of the Cold War reduced the sensitivity of much of Whitehall’s intelligence archive. 
Accordingly, the 1990s saw a flow of high profile archival releases rather than official history. With 
the Soviet bloc declaring a policy of ‘Glasnost’, the West needed to make similar - even superior - 
claims. This public commitment to openness moved in parallel with a desire to restrict information 
on matters which remained sensitive. Well-packaged programmes of document release allowed 
Whitehall to bask in glow of 'freedom' and recalled the imaginative approach of Trend. In a 
remarkably short space of time, Margaret Thatcher's return to the 1950s 'stonewalling' strategy was 
almost forgotten. Yet the era of 'Glasnost' announced in London, Washington and Moscow in the 
1990s had an ambiguous quality. On the one hand, it undeniably brought forth many thousands of 
new documents, many of which were fascinating and all of which were previously classified. On the 
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other hand, it can be argued that this cloaked a more sophisticated programme of information 
management. Certainly, as a result of the more generous release policy of the 1990s, the authorities 
were able to influence the agenda for archive-based researchers of secret service, with historians 
now occupied  - or side-tracked - by the 'new releases'.97  
By the 1990s, the secret services also recognised that the half-century that had elapsed since 
the Second World War provided a measure of safety. Always short of space, they were glad to 
transfer old records that looked increasingly inert. In 1992 SIS took the important decision to begin 
the process of releasing the SOE papers in its custody. MI5 and GCHQ also released large 
quantities of wartime papers, and have even released some early Cold War material. A further effect 
of Open Government was the opening of many hitherto unpublished in-house histories of 
intelligence, including the Mackenzie history of SOE written immediately after the war.98 Sceptics 
might claim that releases continued to focus on wartime enemies and created the impression, 
wittingly or otherwise, that the main business of secret service was pursuing acknowledged foes, 
rather than maintaining surveillance upon neutrals, allies and its own citizens. However, whatever 
the pattern of selection, the deluge of new material has to be welcomed by historians. 
Further SOE official histories on Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, the Low Countries and sea-
borne missions had been commissioned in the 1980s, albeit only two of these had progressed to 
publication in 2003.99 The SIS decision to permit historical work based on co-operation with Oleg 
Gordievsky and on the Mitrokhin archive was probably the most adventurous example of official 
support for the writing of the history of secret service that was seen during the 1990s.100 The 
Special Air Service represented the most controversial area of secret history during this period. SAS 
activities in the Gulf War of 1991 were discussed in some detail in the memoirs of Britain's 
commander and former SAS officer, Sir Peter de la Billiere. This appeared to offer a green light to 
various SAS soldiers, who then emulated their leader's literary endeavours to the dismay of the 
Cabinet Office and the MoD. Once again a seemingly inviolable senior 'insider' had barged a hole in 
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the fence of official secrecy and many lesser figures had scrambled along behind. Attempts were 
made to prosecute some of these ex-SAS scribes, but these were soon abandoned in favour of new 
SAS confidentiality agreement, introduced in 1996 and upheld by the Privy Council in 2003.101
 In the twenty-first century, MI5 has remained ahead of its sister services in boasting an 
active and imaginative history programme. Working on several fronts, it has released more files, it 
has consulted widely about the future of its archives, and it has been conducting an in-house 
programme of interviews. In 2002 it announced the commissioning of an official history, covering 
the period since its foundation in 1909, to be written by Christopher Andrew and to be published on 
its centenary. Some may see this as the fruit of a remarkably enlightened policy instituted by a 
Director General, Stephen Lander, who is himself a trained historian. More cynical voices have 
postulated that secret services only allow historians to inspect their archives once they have been 
cleansed. We are unlikely to know where the balance of truth lies before 2009 and perhaps not even 
then. GCHQ has published an account of its move from Eastcote to Cheltenham in the early 1950s, 
but SIS policy on official history remains obscure.102
 From the authorities' point of view, official history remains by far the best way forward in 
the face of awkward declassification problems. On the one hand, secret services are imperilled if 
they do not keep themselves hidden. Without a track record of intense secrecy, future agents will 
refuse to work for them, especially in countries where memories are long and allegiances are traced 
over generations. For the purposes of the recruitment of agents, secret services know that a 
reputation for extreme secrecy is one of the most potent instruments in their armoury. Stripped of 
this their morale plummets and they become ineffective. On the other hand, many historians feel 
impelled to investigate these secrets. In countries such as Britain and the United States, large secret 
services have formed an integral part of the core executive of government for more than half a 
century.  To understand properly the inner thoughts and purposes of those at the highest level, it is 
essential to enquire into the role of intelligence. Accordingly, secret services will always enjoy an 
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adversarial relationship with historical researchers on the outside who wish to achieve a 
comprehensive understanding of government. Official history, although bringing its own 
difficulties, offers government a middle way and an opportunity of making a positive response to 
the problems of policing the past. 
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